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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In conclusion, it is clear that harmless constitutional error
remains an unsolved problem in Louisiana criminal procedure.
In the opinion of this writer, the proper application of the federal
rule conflicts with present statutory provisions. Hopefully, a
solution will be found that not only resolves the dilemma but
also benefits our system of criminal justice.
E. B. Dittmer II
AGREEMENTS NOT TO COMPETE
American courts traditionally have refused to enforce agree-
ments not to compete in a business, profession or trade unless
such restrictive covenants are merely incidental to the primary
purpose of a larger lawful transaction.' Usually an ancillary
agreement between competitors which limits competition is
presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation
of the federal antitrust laws;2 frequently, however, noncompeti-
tion agreements are used in connection with interests thought
to require protection, such as the sale of a business,s a lease,4
a partnership dissolution5 or a contract of employment.6 In most
jurisdictions these noncompetition agreements will be considered
reasonable, and thus enforceable, if considering the subject
matter, the type of business and the relationship of the parties,
the restriction is intended to afford fair protection to the inter-
ests of the covenantee and not so comprehensive as to impinge
unreasonably upon the public interest or to place undue hard-
ship on the party restricted.7 This broad rule has resulted in
varying interpretations and applications throughout the Amer-
ican court system.8
1. Irving Inv. Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.J. 217, 69 A.2d 725 (1949).
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
3. Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, 164 F. Supp.
1 (S.D. Fla. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); Hirsh v. Miller, 249
La. 489, 187 So.2d 709 (1966).
4. Goldberg v. Tr-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1942); M. M.
Ullman & Co. v. Levy, 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931).
5. McCray v. Blackburn, 236 So.2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Schlag v.
Johnson, 208 S.W. 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
6. Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941);
Aetna Fin. Co. v. Adams, 170 So.2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
247 La. 489, 172 So.2d 294 (1965).
7. Ceresta v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. App. 1951).
8. The first case to reach the courts on noncompetition agreements was
the Dyer case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414), and the court
struck the covenant down as a restraint on economic freedom, regardless





The great majority of jurisdictions have customarily ex-
pressed disfavor with noncompetition agreements.9 The most
formidable display of this opposition has appeared in the form
of prohibitory statutes. With few exceptions these statutory
restrictions have prohibited contracts in which any person is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business
of any kind.10 The most common of the statutory exceptions
are agreements ancillary to the sale of the good will of a busi-
ness or partnership dissolutions. 1 Several states, in addition to
permitting these common exceptions, also exclude from the gen-
eral rule customer solicitation,1 2  customer lists' s and stock
transfer provisions.14 The statutes of Louisiana ' 5 and South
Dakota 8 even permit the use of the basic noncompetition agree-
ments between employer and employee if certain conditions are
fulfilled. However, all statutory schemes have in common the
provision that the restraint must be specifically restricted in
time and geographical area in order to be valid.1 7
Non-Statutory Restrictions
In the absence of statute, a noncompetition covenant to be
enforceable must meet the test of reasonableness in light of the
facts of each particular case.'" Courts are more likely to consider
Mitchel v. Reynolds, I. P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), the court
for the first time evaluating the amount of restraint present and correlating
this to the interests of the parties involved. See Blakej Employee Agree-
ments Not To Compete, 73 HAEV. L. REv. 625 (1960).
9. Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 App. Div. 66, 188 N.Y.S.
678 (1921), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923).
10. ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 22 (1958); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (1966).
11. ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 23-24 (1958); CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-
16602 (Deering 1937); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12 (1967); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 808-809 (1947); N.D. CENTURY CODE tit. 9, § 08-06 (1959); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 218-219 (1966); S.D. CODE tit. 10, § 10.0706 (1939).
12. ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 23 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12 (1967).
13. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.66 (1962).
14. CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (Deering 1937).
15. LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950).
16. S.D. CODE tit. 10, § 10.0706 (1939).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 23-24 (1958); FA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12 (1967).
18. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105
N.E.2d 685 (1952).
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enforceable an agreement ancillary to a sale,19 lease2° or part-
nership2 1 than one involving an employment contract.22 The
most compelling reason for this distinction is that the vendor,
lessor or partner is normally in a much better position to protect
his interests than is the employee bargaining with his employer.28
Regardless of the relationship of the parties involved, the
covenant's reasonableness is thoroughly scrutinized. Generally,
enforceability is determined by weighing the interests of the
person protected, the person restrained and the general public.24
Noncompetition agreements are usually held enforceable if the
restrictions regarding duration and territorial extent are rea-
sonable.2 5 A covenant not to do business in a territory exceeding
that in which the employer does business, or not to do business
with a class of persons with whom the employer is not con-
cerned, would be excessive ;26 by contrast, an agreement to
abstain from a particular business activity for two years within
a restricted geographical area would probably be held enforce-
able.27 Thus the covenant must be no more limiting to the
person restricted than is necessary to protect the covenantee. 28
However, covenantees often have valuable interests which
merit protection. For example, an employer must often invest
sizeable sums of money in employee training.29 Furthermore,
employees can easily become privy to trade secrets, customer
lists and other confidential matters during the course of their
employment. Although protection might be extended in these
19. Tr-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, 164 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); Hirsh v. Miller,
249 La. 489, 187 So.2d 709 (1966).
20. Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1942);
M. M. Ullman & Co. v. Levy, 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931).
21. McCray v. Blackburn, 236 So.2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Schlag
v. Johnson, 208 S.W. 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
22. McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. 173, 372 S.W.2d 220 (1963).
23. National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So.2d 238 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d 110 (1965).
24. Hickman v. Branan, 151 So. 113 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1983); Arthur
Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952).
25. Desselle v. Petrossi, 207 So.2d 190 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
252 La. 108, 209 So.2d 39 (1968); Ingram Corp. v. Circle, 188 So.2d 96 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 712, 190 So.2d 232 (1966).
26. Kinney v. Scarbrough Co., 138 Ga. 77, 74 S.E. 772 (1912).
27. Bennett v. Kimsey, 218 Ga. 470, 128 S.E.2d 506 (1962).
28. 5 S. WEIIgSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1636 (rev. ed.
1936).
29. Aetna Fin. Co. v. Adams, 170 So.2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 247 La. 489, 172 So.2d 294 (1965).
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situations to a covenantee in the absence of a restrictive
covenant,80 written evidence of the agreement often facilitates
the granting of protection where a court might otherwise be
hesitant to intervene. Even with these normally protectable
interests, the courts must still compare the value of these inter-
ests with the individual's needs and freedom from future
restraint. After assessing the needs of both parties a court must
balance these needs against the possible effect on the general
public to reach its determination of reasonableness.
Noncompetition Agreements in Louisiana
Employment Contracts-Pre-Statutory Restrictions
Louisiana has generally followed the theory that noncom-
petition agreements ancillary to employment contracts are to
be examined more critically than other restrictive covenants.8'
However, the courts in earlier cases did not employ the rea-
sonableness test in assessing the validity of restrictive agree-
30. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967). A
trade secret has been said to consist "of any formula or pattern, any ma-
chine or process of manufacturing or of any device or compilation of infor-
mation used in one's business; and which may give to the user an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."
Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Md. 1946).
When a process or formula gains trade secret status it will, in all prob-
ability, be protected by the courts without the necessity of a restrictive
covenant. For this reason a more extensive survey would be beyond the
scope of this Comment. For more specific information on the trade secret
doctrine, see R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADBMARKS
(1950); R. MILRAM, TRADE ScRETrs (1968); A. TURNER, THE LAw OF TRADE Ss-
CRETs (1962). For an article dealing strictly with Louisiana trade secrecy,
see Barranger, Industrial Trade Secrecy in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. REv. 775.
(1969).
Customer lists are usually spoken of in terms of those which have been
written and those which have been committed to memory. The majority
position in common law jurisdictions seems to be that protection will be
extended to an employer's written customer list, even without a restrictive
covenant. When taking this position the courts necessarily exclude memo-
rized lists from such protection. See T. P. Laboratories, Inc. v. Hugh, 261
F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Wis. 1965), aff'd, 371 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1966); Blake,
Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625 (1960); Note,
40 TUL. L. REV. 424 (1966). But see American Republic Ins. Co. v. Union
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 553 (D. Ore. 1968); Morgan's Home Equip.
Co. v. Martucci, 890 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957); Bender, Trade Secret Pro-
tection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970).
31. M. M. Ullman & Co. v. Levy, 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931); Desselle
v. Petrossi, 207 So.2d 190 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 108, 209
So.2d 39 (1968); Ingram Corp. v. Circle, 188 So.2d 96 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966);
National Motor Club, Inc. v. Conque, 173 So.2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
dented, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d 110 (1965); Marine Forwarding & Shipping Co.
v. Barone, 154 So.2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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ments. Rather than follow this traditional test, it appears that
most courts used the doctrine of "serious consideration" as a
basis to invalidate virtually all noncompetition covenants ancil-
lary to employment contracts.32
The "serious consideration" theory was founded in the case
of Blanchard v. Haber.8 In Blanchard, a dentist-employee was
prohibited by covenant from practicing dentistry within five
blocks of his employer for ten years after termination of his
employment. Although both the employer and the employee
could voluntarily terminate the employment contract on 30-day
notice, the court felt that this right of termination, coupled with
the noncompetition covenant, weighed too heavily in the em-
ployer's favor, and as such the restrictive provision lacked
serious consideration.3 4 With no consideration there was a lack
of mutuality of obligation and the covenant was therefore void.
The Blanchard court based its decision solely on the serious
consideration doctrine without discussing any of the other factors
involved, although it seems that adequate consideration had in
fact been given.
From this point confusion spread concerning the enforce-
ability of restrictive covenants. Two years after Blanchard a
federal district court in Cali v. National Linen Services8 8 upheld
a one-year restrictive covenant, stating that to be valid an agree-
ment of this nature must be reasonable, supported -by serious
consideration, and the restraint no broader than necessary for
the protection of the party with whom the contract was made.?
However, two of the most prominent state court decisions after
Cali, Shreveport Laundries v. Teagle88 and Cloverland Dairy
Products Co. v. Grace,8 9 relied solely on the serious considera-
tion approach in nullifying noncompetitive employment con-
tracts. It would appear from these later decisions that the
32. Cioverland Dairy Prod. Co. v. Grace, 180 La. 694, 157 So. 393 (1934);
Blanchard v. Haber, 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928); Shreveport Laundries
v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
33. 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928).
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2464; Blanchard v. Haber, 166 La. 1014, 1017-18,
118 So. 117, 118-19 (1928).
35. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2024, 2034; Blanchard v. Haber, 166 La. 1014, 1019,
118 So. 117, 119 (1928).
36. 38 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1930).
37. Id. at 37.
38. 139 So. 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
39. 180 La. 694, 157 So. 393 (1934).
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majority of the courts adhered to the serious consideration
theory, but certain language used in the cases actually made the
majority position less well defined. Thus the court in Shreveport
Laundries,40 while basing its decision on serious consideration,
indicated that even if serious consideration had been given, the
noncompetition clauses would not have been upheld unless it
clearly appeared that nonenforcement would result in sub-
stantial injury to the opposite party.41 It seems, therefore, that
while in reality each court formulated its own test for the
enforceability of such covenants, most Louisiana courts osten-
sibly based their decisions, if possible, on serious consideration.
42
Employment Contracts-Statutory Restrictions
Although prior to 1934 there did exist uncertainty in the
noncompetition clause cases, the vast majority of the decisions
nullified such covenants, regardless of the basis of decision.
The courts felt that with the passage of Act 133 of 1934 (now
R.S. 23:921), the legislature was approving judicial disfavor
of restrictive clauses. In Marine Forwarding & Shipping Co. v.
Barone, the court spoke of the statute as a declaration against
restrictions on the spirit of free labor.48 It is apparent that the
court was correct in making such a statement. Act 133 of 1934
provided:
"No employer shall require or direct any employee to enter
into any contract whereby the employee agrees not to engage
in any competing business for himself, or as the employee
of another, upon the termination of his contract of employ-
ment with such employer, and all such contracts, or provi-
sions thereof containing such agreements shall be null and
unenforceable in any court .. ,4
40. 139 So. 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
41. Id. at 566.
42. Although the courts no longer had to use the serious consideration
basis for nullifying such covenants after the passage of R.S. 23:921 in 1934,
it was not until Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Serv., 221
La. 677, 60 So.2d 83 (1952), that the courts actually condemned the, con-
sideration doctrine as being an erroneous basis for decision. For a more
recent decision discussing serious consideration, potestative conditions and
noncompetition clauses, see Long v. Foster & Associates, Inc., 242 La. 295,
136 So.2d 48 (1961).
43. 154 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
44. LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950).
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In National Motor Club of Louisiana, Inc. v. Conque45 the court
summarized the basic public policy behind the statute:
"[T]heir essential basis is the right of individual freedom
and of individuals to better themselves in our free-enterprise
society, where liberty of the individual is guaranteed. A
strong public policy reason likewise for holding unfavorable
an agreement exacted by an employer of an employee not
to compete after the latter leaves his employment, is the
disparity in bargaining power, under which an employee,
fearful of losing his means of livelihood, cannot readily
refuse to sign an agreement which, if enforceable, amounts
to his contracting away his liberty to earn his livelihood
in the field of his experience except by continuing in the
employment of his present employer. 4 6
Armed with legislative approval of their policy, the courts have
consistently interpreted Act 133 of 1934 as positing a broad policy
against the validity of noncompetition agreements between em-
ployers and their employees.47
Non-Statutory Exceptions to R.S. 23:921
Although R.S. 23:921 contains broadly defined prohibitions
and has been utilized to its limits by the courts, exceptions
(other than the 1962 amendment, discussed infra) have de-
veloped, or are in various stages of development. These excep-
tions fall into three categories: employee and customer solicita-
tion, customer lists and trade secrets.
The largest percentage of these exceptions fall in the cus-
tomer and employee solicitation category. Oddly enough, many
of the early Louisiana cases were actually concerned with
covenants not to solicit rather than covenants not to compete,
and were held unenforceable on the doctrine of serious con-
45. 173 So.2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d
110 (1965).
46. Id, at 241.
47. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967).
It is submitted that Act 133 of 1934 embodies a public policy doctrine which,
except for statutory and non-statutory exceptions, cannot be infringed.
See LA. CIV. CODS art. 11. See also Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp.
678 (E.D. La.), afo'd, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965); Marine Forwarding & Ship-
ping Co. v. Barone, 154 So.2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Gauthier v. Magee,
141 So.2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); and Thomas v. McCrery, 147 So.2d
467, 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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sideration.48 In 1952, in Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire
Detection Service,49 the courts first began to recognize the non-
competition covenant exception, there dealing with an employee
solicitation clause. The court distinguished contracts in which
an employee was restrained from competing with his former
employer from those in which the employee agreed not to per-
suade other employees to discontinue their relationships with
the employer, and held the latter valid.50 In 1963 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal, in Delta Finance Co. of La. v. Graves,
enforced an agreement not to solicit the former employer's
customers, relying on the same distinction as had been drawn
in Martin-Parry ten years earlier. 5'
The second category of non-statutory exceptions developed
in cases treating customer list agreements. The first case to
indicate that such covenants might be excluded from the statute's
coverage was Baton Rouge Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Bloomen,
stiel, in which the court inferred it would have upheld an agree-
ment prohibiting a former employee from using the customer
list of his previous employer if the employer had been able to
prove that the employee had actually been using the list.52
Since then the courts have on several occasions indicated their
desire to give adequate protection to an employer's customer
list. For example, in Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall5 and Buckeye
Garment Rental Co. v. Jones,54 the courts stated that they would
extend broad protection to customer lists in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Other decisions, although favoring in theory the
enforceability of customer list provisions, have indicated a more
restrictive attitude. In both Theatre Time Clock, Inc. v. Stewart"5
and National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque,56 the courts
48. Cloverland Dairy Prod. Co. v. Grace, 180 La. 694, 157 So. 393 (1934);
Shreveport Laundries v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
49. 221 La. 677, 60 So.2d 83 (1952).
50. Id. at 688, 60 So.2d at 85.
51. 180 So.2d 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). Judicial approbation of non-
solicitation agreements has been expressed in several recent cases: Servisco
v. Morreale, 312 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La. 1970); Buckeye Garment Rental Co.
v. Jones, 276 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1967); National School Studios, Inc. v.
Barrios, 236 So.2d 309 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Bookkeepers Business Serv.,
Inc. v. Davis, 208 So.2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), all concerning similar
agreements not to solicit a former employer's customers.
52. 88 So.2d 742, 746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
53. 237 F. Supp. 678, 680 (E.D. La.), afl'd, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965).
54. 276 F. Supp. 560, 562 (E.D. La. 1967).
55. 276 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. La. 1967).




suggested their amenability to enforcing agreements not to use
written customer lists, but did not extend protection to customer
lists memorized by the former employee.""
A third judicially created exception to Louisiana's noncom-
petition agreement statute appears to be developing with regard
to noncompetition agreements in which the employee has
obligated himself not to disclose his employer's trade secrets.M
Neither Louisiana nor any other jurisdiction has any legislation
specifically adopting the traditional trade secret concepts;69 how-
ever, while the common law jurisdictions have seen an abun-
dance of trade secret litigation, Louisiana jurisprudence on the
subject is sparse. In Baton Rouge Cigarette Service, Inc. v.
Bloomenstiel,80 a Louisiana court was first exposed to a trade
secret provision, but the court did not consider the clause in
reaching its decision. Only four Louisiana cases, Brown & Root,
Inc. v. LaBauve, 1 Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Continental Oil
Co.,0 2 Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 3 and Buckeye Garment
Rental Co. v. Jones, 4 have dealt squarely with the trade secret
issue, and of these Brown & Root and Great Lakes Carbon Corp.
involved a fiduciary rather than contractual obligation. Buck-
eye,15 a 1970 case, is the most recent decision upholding an
employment contract containing a trade secret provision. Stan-
dard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe,66 however, is the only Louisiana
case which has discussed at any length the trade secret doctrine
in relation to our public policy restrictions. In Standard Brands,
57. As can be seen, these decisions follow the majority position in the
common law that only written customer lists will be given protection, as
discussed in note 31 supra. The court in Baton Rouge Cigarette Serv., Inc.
v. Bloomenstiel, 88 So.2d 742 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956), also indicated that it
would extend protection only to written customer lists, rather than those
which have been memorized by the former employee.
58. It must be stated that although the Louisiana courts apparently
treat noncompetition agreements containing trade secret provisions as ex-
ceptions, in reality they are not exceptions. This is because a true trade
secret does not require the protection of a restrictive covenant, and will be
protected by the courts with or without a noncompetition agreement. See
note 30 supra.
59. Barranger, Industrial Trade Secrecy in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. Rsv.
775 (1969).
60. 88 So.2d 742 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
61. 219 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. La. 1962).
62. 219 F. Supp. 468 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 345 F.2d 175 (5th Cir), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
63. 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967).
64. 276 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1967).
65. Id.
66. 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967).
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trade secrets were defined to include not only communications
which were declared at the time to be confidential, but also
information which the employee should know the employer
would prefer not to have revealed to his competitors, including
unique business practices, lists of names and all other matters
which are known only to the employer's staff.67 Although the
court did state that it would, in the proper case, uphold a non-
competition agreement based on the maintenance of trade secrets,
it indicated that it would restrict its protection to those cases
in which the employer could show that disclosure was either
imminent or inevitable. 68
Even when noncompetition agreements fall into one of the
exceptional categories, this does not mean that they are not
totally without limits. These exceptions, like many other situa-
tions not within the purview of the statute, are judged accord-
ing to the reasonableness of the covenant, considering the inter-
ests of the contracting parties and the general public.6 9
Act 104 of 1962
In 1962 the legislature mitigated the effect of R.S. 23:921
by enacting Act 104, and thereby established a limited exception
for the "qualified" employer. This exception is offered to em-
ployers incurring an expense in the training of an employee
or in advertising the employee's association with the business.
Even when satisfying these statutory requirements, however, the
agreement not to compete must be limited to two years and can
only restrict the employee's competition in the same business
and territory as his former employer.70
67. Id. Although this trade secret definition contains a reference to
customer lists, the reference Is to "secret" customer lists. The normal
customer list will be a non-confidential enumeration of names which the
employer is not actually trying to conceal from the public, or, even if he
is, he will not often succeed in doing so. For this reason the usual customer
list will not fall under the trade secret concepts. For a discussion of the
distinction between customer lists, see Servisco v. Morreale, 312 F. Supp.
103 (E.D. La. 1970).
68. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 261 (E.D. La. 1967).
69. Hickman v. Branan, 151 So. 113 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
70. LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 104, pro-
vides: "that in those cases where the employer incurs an expense In the
training of the employee or incurs an expense in the advertising of the
business that the employer is engaged in, then in that event it shall be
permissible for the employer and employee to enter into a voluntary con-
tract and agreement whereby the employee is permitted to agree and bind
himself that at the termination of his or her employment that said em-
ployee will not enter into the same business that employer Is engaged over
the same route or in the same territory for a period of two years."
1972]
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The courts have struggled with the proper interpretation
of this amendment since its inception. The perplexity arises
from the meaning of the terms referring to the expenses incurred
in training and advertising of the employee. The majority of
the courts are in agreement that the training spoken of in the
statute must in some manner be directed toward the contracting
employee, and the advertising expense must be incurred while
advertising the employee's connection with the business rather
than in advertising the business itself.71 But at this point cer-
tainty ends and the conflict begins.
Disorder has arisen in determining exactly how much money
must be expended in training or advertisement by an employer
to be eligible for the limited protection offered by the statute.
The first decision on this point was Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall,7 2
in which a federal district court stated that the terms of the
amendment imported money not usually or customarily ex-
pended in the normal course of employment and further that
the employee must be made a specialist by virtue of the special
training received.78 Somewhat later, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Aetna Finance Co. v. Adams considered the statute
as requiring only the normal expense incurred in training an
employee or advertising his association with the business, al-
though the court found substantial expense had in fact been
incurred.74 In Aetna the expenses considered substantial were
constant supervision and training administered through various
manuals of operation and legal bulletins.75 In contrast, the Third
Circuit, in National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, followed
the Nalco decision and said there must be substantial sums spent
in training or advertisement in order to utilize the amended
statute.76 The National Motor Club court considered a $500 adver-
tisement expense, some of which had accrued prior to formation
of the restrictive covenant, and reimbursement for sales meeting
71. Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. La.), af'cd, 347
F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965); National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So.2d
238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d. 110 (1965); but see
World Wide Health Studios, Inc. v. Desmond, 222 So.2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1969).
72. 237 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965).
73. Id. at 681.
74. 170 So.2d 740, 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ denied, 247 La. 489,
172 So.2d 294 (1965).
75. Id. at 743.
76. National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So.2d 238, 241 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d 110 (1965).
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expenses to be normal, rather than substantial, expenditures.77
In both Aetna and National the supreme court denied certiorari
on the ground that the judgments were correct.78
The federal district courts again construed the amendment
in 1967 in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe79 and Theatre Time
Clock, Inc. v. Stewart.80 Although not actually dealing with a
noncompetition covenant in Standard Brands, the court made
the statement that Act 104 of 1962 applied only when the em-
ployer had spent a substantial amount of money on training
and advertisement 1 . In Theatre Time Clock an employee's train-
ing consisted of four weeks supervision on a sales route, and
the court, in nullifying the covenant not to compete, said that
the employer must incur substantial expense in training the
employee to gain the benefits of R.S. 23:921 as amended.82
In 1969, the Second Circuit, in World Wide Health Studios,
Inc. v. Desmond, stated that it agreed with the Aetna normal
expense interpretation of the amendment, basing its opinion on
a literal reading of the statute, which states "incurs an expense,"
not a substantial expense88 The two most recent cases constru-
ing R.S. 23:921 as amended have not settled the uncertainty sur-
rounding the statute's meaning; indeed, the situation has be-
come more precarious. In 1970 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal rendered its interpretation of the statute in National
School Studios, Inc. v. Barrios.84 Although the court held two
weeks training and one picture in an advertisement to be sub-
stantial expense, it agreed with Aetna, and said the statute con-
templated only the employer expending normal and customary
sums of money in training the employee or advertising his
connection with the employer's business.85 The latest opinion
of a Louisiana court on this question was handed down in Peltier
v. Hebert,86 in which the employee's training consisted of super-
vision on a milk route for two weeks. The Third Circuit held
77. Id. at 242-43.
78. 247 La. 489, 172 So.2d 294 (1965); 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d 110 (1965)
(respectfully).
79. 264 F. Supp 254 (E.D. La. 1967).
80. 276 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. La. 1967).
81. 264 F. Supp. 254, 266 (E.D. La. 1967).
82. 276 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D. La. 1967).
83. 222 So.2d 517, 522 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
84. 236 So.2d 309 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
85. Id. at 312.
86. 245 So.2d 511 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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that the employer had not incurred a substantial expense in
training the employee, and voided a one year noncompetition
agreement, stating that more than a minimal training and ad-
vertising expenses was needed to constitute a valid exception
to the prohibition of R.S. 23: 921.87
Sales, Leases, Partnerships and Associations
Louisiana courts have traditionally followed the doctrine of
reasonableness in determining the validity of a noncompetition
agreement ancillary to a contract for the sale of a business and
its good will.'ss In most of these cases the courts have used the
same standards employed in common law jurisdictions, i.e., the
reasonableness of the restrictions as to duration and territorial
extent. In Wintz v. Vogt,89 the court considered reasonable an
agreement whereby the vendor of a business was restricted for
two years from selling a certain product within the city of New
Orleans. An agreement by the vendor with the purchaser of
the remaining stock not to compete with the corporation for a
limited time was considered not against public policy and thus
enforceable in Hickman v. Branan.9 Considered unreasonable
in Lindstrom v. Sauer91 was a covenant barring the vendor from
competing with the buyer within the city of New Orleans as
long as the buyer was in business.9 2 It must be remembered that
even if a restrictive covenant ancillary to a contract of sale is
held reasonable, it is only a personal obligation of the vendor
87. Id. at 515.
88. Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson, 127 La. 835, 54 So. 47 (1911).
89. 3 La. Ann. 16 (1848).
90. 151 So. 113 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
91. 166 So. 636 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936); but see May v. Johnson, 128 So.
540 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) (covenant not to compete in town for as long
as vendee in business held reasonable); Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson,
127 La. 835, 54 So. 47 (1911) (upheld agreement not to compete in Franklin
until given permission by the buyer).
92. The reasonableness test as a basis of decision has carried over into
more recent cases. In Ingram Corp. v. Circle, 188 So.2d 96 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 249 La. 712, 190 So.2d 232 (1966), an agreement not to
compete for four years In the same area in which the buyer of the business
was operating was considered reasonable; see also Desselle v. Petrossi, 207
So.2d 190 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 108, 209 So.2d 39 (1968)
(upheld agreement restricting vendor from competing with the buyer within
city of New Orleans for five years). In the most recent case, Mathieu v.
Williams, 255 So.2d 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), the court upheld a covenant




and has been held to be unenforceable by a third party trans-
feree against the original vendor.9 a
Although the decisions rendered on noncompetition agree-
ments ancillary to sales are generally consistent and predictable,
there still remains one type of case in which the courts have
not firmly stated their position. This involves the unusual factual
situation in which the vendor, often as part of the total sales
transaction, is employed after the sale by the purchaser of the
business. When this occurs and there exists a noncompetition
agreement, the courts must decide whether such an agreement
is to be treated as an incident of the sale or as a completely
separate and independent employer-employee contract subject
to R.S. 23:921. In Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Kokosky,94 the supreme
court, although enforcing the covenant as part of the sale of the
business, indicated that it might have ruled differently had
there been adequate proof of a lack of serious consideration.
In the more recent decision, Hirsh v. Miller,95 the Fourth Circuit
ruled such a case should be considered a sale, thus prohibiting
the application of R.S. 23:921. On review of the Hirsh case, the
supreme court did not have to rule on this specific question, but
did express the opinion that it would in all probability have
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit and ruled Miller an employee
and entitled to statutory protection."
It appears that the validity of restrictive covenants ancillary
to leases is also determined by their reasonableness, though
there are few Louisiana cases on point. In M. M. Ullman & Co.
v. Levy,97 the court stated that it would, in the proper case, have
upheld a covenant not to compete for three years with the
lessee in New Orleans. Noncompetition agreements incident to
leases are considered, just as sales,98 to be personal obligations,
enforceable only between the two contracting parties.99
The cases concerning covenants ancillary to contracts be-
tween partners and associates are unsatisfactory; apparently,
the courts cannot agree on the proper basis for reaching determi-
93. Thomas v. McCrery, 147 So.2d 467 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
94. 113 La. 449, 37 So. 24 (1904).
95. 167 So.2d 539 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
96. 249 La. 489, 187 So.2d 709 (1966).
97. 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931).
98. 63 So.2d 437, 439 (La. App. 1st ir. 1953).
99. Hebert v. Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343, 7 So. 580 (1890).
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nations of the enforceability of such noncompetition agreements.
In Cust v. Item Co., 00 decided by the supreme court, a covenant
in a contract of copartnership prohibited a "partner" from com-
peting for three years after dissolution of the partnership. It
appears that the court, although speaking of the lack of mutuali-
ty of obligation, actually based its decision on R.S. 23:921."10
However, in the more recent case of McCray v. Blackburn,112
the Third Circuit upheld a noncompetition agreement between
partners, clearly distinguishing such noncompetition covenants
from agreements ancillary to employment contracts. In McCray
the court held R.S. 23:921 inapplicable, and instead applied the
reasonableness test to partnership agreements. 1 8
The basis for determination of the validity of a restrictive
covenant between associates seems to be just as unpredictable
as in partnership agreements. In 1953 the First Circuit, in Nelson
v. Associated Branch Pilots of Port of Lake Charles,0 4 declared
unenforceable an agreement between members of a harbor pilots'
association in which withdrawing associates had to post bond
to assure that they would not compete with other members of
the association. The court stated that these associates were
essentially the same as employees, and as such, were protected
by the broad public policy against such agreements as expressed
by the legislature in R.S. 23: 921.105 But in a later case, McCray v.
Cole,106 the Third Circuit upheld a noncompetition agreement
ancillary to an associational contract. The covenant stipulated
liquidated damages if one of the members began competing
with his former associates. The court employed the reasonable-
ness test to reach its decision, and distinguished the case from
situations prohibited by R.S. 23:921 by saying that the covenant
did not actually prohibit associates from competing, but merely
made it less profitable to do so. '0
100. 200 La. 515, 8 So.2d 361 (1942).
101. Id. at 525, 8 So.2d at 364. The court said: "The contract containing
such a clause in this case purports to be a copartnership agreement, but
public policy forbids such a clause as well in such a contract as we have
here as in a contract of employment."
102. 236 So.2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
103. Id. at 861-62.
104. 63 So.2d 437 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
105. Id. at 439.
106. 236 So.2d 863 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
107. Id. at 867-68. To the writer it is difficult to consider such an agree-
ment as not "actually" prohibiting competition. It is submitted that associ-
ates are not included within the strict coverage of R.S. 23:921 and by con-
struing the statute in this manner such justifications for not using the




From the foregoing discussion it seems apparent that juris-
prudential inconsistencies and conflicts exist which make the
law concerning noncompetition clauses uncertain in Louisiana.
However, there are several statements that can be made with
a degree of confidence. Since the passage of R.S. 23:921 the
Louisiana courts, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,
have repeatedly held employee-employer noncompetition cove-
nants unenforceable. However, some exceptions-customer and
employee solicitation, customer lists and trade secrets-have
apparently developed which evade the statute's coverage. It
also seems well settled that the reasonableness of a restrictive
covenant incidental to a sale or lease will determine its validity.
Beyond this point, however, noncompetition agreement juris-
prudence is marked with indefiniteness.
This unpredictability is most evident in cases dealing with
Act 104 of 1962. On one hand are decisions holding that the
employer must spend substantial sums of money on an em-
ployee's training and advertisement, while on the other are de-
cisions holding only normal expenditures are needed to qualify
for the limited benefits of the amendment.
Construing the words of the statute literally it would seem
that any expense incurred by an employer in training or adver-
tisement would entitle him to enforcement of a two year re-
strictive covenant. If, however, this is the proper meaning of
the statute, then virtually any employer can qualify for this
exception, and this would appear to be inimical to the public
policy considerations behind R.S. 23:921. It thus seems that the
substantial expense theory would be more in harmony with the
traditional Louisiana public policy concepts, while at the same
time protecting the interests of the qualified employer.
Restrictive covenants between partners and associates have
also been a source of confusion in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
Some courts, having clearly distinguished noncompetition agree-
ments between partners and associates from those incident to
an employment contract, have held R.S. 23:921 inapplicable, and
instead analyzed the covenant in light of its reasonableness.
The cases drawing this distinction must be contrasted with the
decisions in which partners and associates are found to be
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"essentially" employees and as such protected by R.S. 23:921.
It would seem that the problem in this area also relates to the
proper interpretation of the statute in that the courts must
decide exactly who is to be considered within the statute's defi-
nition of employee. It appears that the courts, although using
divergent reasoning, have reached the most equitable result
in the majority of the partnership and association cases, but
have done so at the expense of certainty. The statute, as drafted,
seems to apply only to the strict employer-employee relation-
ship, and not to a partner or associate. Interpreting the statute
in this way, the courts could still reach just results in partner-
ship and association noncompetition agreement litigation by
using the reasonableness test.
In the final analysis, the perplexities of many of the non-
competition clause cases could be clarified by a more uniform
court interpretation of R.S. 23:921. As this is unlikely, it is
suggested that the legislature amend the statute to eliminate the
uncertainty surrounding its meaning. In this way the Louisiana
courts would have a more efficient and workable vehicle to
determine the validity of noncompetition agreements.
James M. Duncan
MASTER'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR TORTS UNDER
ARTICLE 2320-A TERMINOLOGICAL "TAR-BABY"
Under Civil Code article 176, "the master is answerable for
the offenses and quasi-offenses committed by his servants,
according to the rules which are explained under the title: Of
quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses." Thus a mas-
ter's liability for physical harm caused by the negligent conduct
of his servant is governed by Civil Code articles 2315-2320, espe-
cially article 2320. It is the purpose of this Comment to examine
the exact and concise distinction between the master-servant
and principal-agent relationships insofar as liability for the negli-
gent tort of a servant or a non-servant agent is concerned. A
study of article 2320, its judicial "amendment" and a view of the
jurisprudence in four particular areas' will emphasize the dis-
1. The four areas that have given the courts particular difficulty deal
with the liability for the torts resulting In physical injury in the following
cases: the husband for the wife's automobile accidents; the automobile dealer
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